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I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated section 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
II. STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR APPEAL 
Plaintiffs Issues A and B relate to their claim that the trial court failed to 
give requested jury instructions. The proper standard of review by this Court is the 
"correctness of error standard." As used by Utah's appellate courts, "correctness" means 
that no particular deference is given to the trial court's ruling on questions of law. See 
Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1256 (Utah 1998). Plaintiff failed to preserve Issue "A" 
for appeal. 
Plaintiffs Issues C and D involve the trial court's claimed failure to grant 
post-trial motions for JNOV or in the alternative, for a new trial. The proper standard of 
review for both issues is the "traditional abuse of discretion standard." The abuse of 
discretion standard flows from the trial court's significant role in pre-appellate litigation. 
The trial court has "a great deal of latitude in determining the most fair and efficient 
manner to conduct court business." Morton v. Continental Baking Co., 938 P.2d 271, 
275 (Utah 1997). This is because "[t]he trial judge is in the best position to evaluate the 
status of his cases, as well as the attitudes, motives, and credibility of the parties." Id. A 
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trial court abuses its discretion if there is "no reasonable basis for the decision." 
Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 860 P.2d 937, 938 (Utah 1993). A trial court's 
determination will be reversed if the ruling "is so unreasonable that it can be classified as 
arbitrary and capricious or a clear abuse of discretion." Kunzler v. O 'Dell, 855 P.2d 270, 
275 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). Whether a trial court properly denied a motion for a new trial 
is clearly within the abuse of discretion standard. See Child v. Gonda, 972 P.2d 425, 428 
(Utah 1998). Further, this Court has indicated that at the extreme end of the discretion 
spectrum would be a decision by the trial court to grant or deny a new trial based on 
insufficiency of the evidence. See A.K.&R. Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Aspen 
Constr., 977 P.2d 518, 522 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). 
Because plaintiffs Issues C and D involve a claim that both the jury and the 
judge failed to make proper rulings based upon "insufficiency of the evidence," the 
applicable standard of review for these issues is the traditional abuse of discretion 
standard. 
III. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS, 
1. Plaintiff has failed to cite any relevant case law, statute or ordinance 
which suggests a duty exists requiring a motorist to choose one public road over another 
2 
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based upon a subjective declaration of "hazardous." To adopt this "duty" would be to 
bestow a viable cause of action upon every person involved in an accident, whether they 
were technically at fault or not, assuming they could find a safer route for the other party 
to have taken. 
In addition, any error is "harmless" because plaintiff was more familiar 
with this road and intersection than was the defendant and would therefore be subject to 
more "fault" than defendant under her "unsafe route" theory. 
Finally, a party is not entitled to have every "creative theory" reduced to a 
jury instruction. The plaintiffs claim is that the defendant negligently drove his vehicle. 
The plaintiff was not precluded from arguing that the defendant could and should have 
taken a safer route and in fact did so in closing arguments. The jury heard the argument 
but simply was not convinced. 
2. The Court agreed to give a "sudden peril" instruction. However, the 
language used by plaintiff was not clear. Particularly, the plaintiff used the phrase "if, 
but not only i f without further explanation for that qualifier. The Court simply asked 
plaintiffs counsel to reword the instruction, to have it approved by defense counsel and 
the instruction would be given. Contrary to plaintiffs suggestion in her brief, plaintiffs 
counsel never came back to defense counsel or the Court with another sudden peril 
3 
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instruction. She simply abandoned the sudden peril instruction. The record is devoid of 
any attempt by plaintiffs counsel to allow the Court to rule on the issue and, accordingly, 
the plaintiff did not adequately preserve this issue for appeal. 
3. Although the plaintiff did not sufficiently marshal the evidence 
supporting the jury's verdict, even the plaintiffs brief contains more than adequate 
evidence to support the jury's verdict. Specifically, if the jury believed nothing more 
than the plaintiffs own expert accident reconstructionist when he acknowledged that 
there was "a very good likelihood that the collision would have happened even if Mr. 
Hyatt [the defendant] has stayed completely in his own lane of travel." That piece of 
information alone is sufficient for the jury to find that although the defendant may have 
been negligent for slightly passing over the center line, he was not a "substantial factor" 
in causing the accident since the plaintiff was almost entirely left of center and would 
have collided with the defendant even if the defendant had been completely within his 
own lane. 
Further, plaintiffs argument is essentially to do away with the concept of 
"proximate cause." The plaintiff suggests that anytime a jury finds a party negligent, it 
must then also find that the party was a proximate cause of the injury. Were that the 
case, proximate causation would no longer be an element of a tort. 
4 
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4. Notwithstanding the fact that plaintiffs brief contains five complete 
pages of citations and quotes supporting the jury verdict (even though this is an 
incomplete listing), the plaintiff then suggests that this is insufficient evidence because 
she then lays out seven-and-a-half pages of evidence contrary to the verdict. Multiple 
fact and expert witnesses testified in support of the verdict and in this case, the defendant 
suggests that the evidence was overwhelmingly in favor of the jury's verdict. 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. The District Court Properly Refused to Give a Separate Jury Instruction 
Regarding the Plaintiffs Claim that Defendant had a Duty to Take a Different 
Route. 
Plaintiff contends that she was entitled to instruct the jury that they may 
find a party negligent for driving on a "hazardous" route. The proposed jury instruction 
is as follows: 
You may find, depending on the facts and circumstances of 
this case, either or both drivers negligent not only for their 
driving conduct itself but also, if he or she or both knew the 
route taken was hazardous, for taking that route. (R. at 778). 
To begin, plaintiff did not even attempt to define for the jury the word "hazardous." That 
failure alone justifies the Court's refusal to give the instruction. Was it hazardous 
because blind or deaf children lived on the street? Was it hazardous because hazardous 
5 
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materials were stored adjacent to the roadway? Was it hazardous because the road was 
slippery, or bumpy, or in bad repair, etc.? 
In addition, plaintiff has failed to establish any duty on the part of the 
defendant to take a different route. Plaintiff assumes, without any support, that all drivers 
have a duty to plan their route out in advance to take the least traveled, safest route there 
is to your destination. Failure to do so, under the plaintiffs argument, is an actionable 
tort. There is no state statute, city ordinance or Utah case law to support the proposition 
that a new duty has been create which precludes motorists from using a particular public 
road because there may be, in someone else's mind, a safer route. Plaintiffs tort action 
for a hazardous intersection is not against a motorist using the public road; rather, against 
those responsible for the hazardous road. In this case, the plaintiff complains of a blind 
"S" curve, foliage near the comer and old cars parked on the comer. Her cause of action 
for the blind "S" curve is against those who designed the road; her cause of action for the 
overgrown foliage near the home is against the homeowner on the comer who allowed 
the foliage to overgrow, and her cause of action for the presence of old cars on the comer 
is against the owners of the old cars. Plaintiff suggests that rather than pursuing those 
causes of action, the motoring public must cease using this public roadway. This 
argument is implausible, impractical, and not supported by Utah law. Indeed, should the 
6 
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Court adopt plaintiffs argument, even a drunk motorist who runs a red light will be able 
to sue the person that he hits because that person could have, and should have, taken a 
safer route. 
Plaintiff cites four cases in support of her proposed jury instruction, but 
fails to lay out one fact in any of them. That is because the Utah cases deal with 
pedestrian injuries decided during the era when contributory negligence barred recovery. 
None of the Utah cases even involve an automobile. They deal with pedestrians falling 
into ditches (Wold v. Ogden City, 258 P.2d 453 (Utah 1953)), on sidewalks (Wightman v. 
Bettilyon 's Inc., 390 P.2d 120 (Utah 1964)), or even in hallways in apartment buildings 
(Baker v. Decker, 212 P.2d 679 (Utah 1949)). The Illinois case found a pedestrian 
contributorily negligent for crossing a busy road at night at an uncontrolled intersection 
when she could have crossed at a controlled intersection, with a crosswalk one block 
down. Blacconeri v. Aguayo, 478 N.E.2d 546 (111. App. 1985). All these cases dealt with 
a pedestrian plaintiff who assumed a known risk, not a defendant driver who failed to 
take a different public roadway. The comparison to this case is so weak that it did not 
even justify a recitation of the facts by plaintiff. 
Even if a motorist has a duty to carefully pick the safest route to his or her 
destination, any error by the court in failing to give this instruction is harmless. One of 
7 
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the facts that plaintiff failed to marshal in her brief is that the plaintiff was likely more 
familiar with this road and intersection than was the defendant. The plaintiffs boyfriend, 
James Johnson, testified in his deposition, that: 
We had been down the road because her work was there, my 
work was just over on West Temple and 27th South. If the 
traffic was, well, her work was real close so she took that 
road a lot. And there was no reason, except for I mean, she 
would have had to have had some special reason for being out 
in the middle of the road like that. (R. 583) (Emphasis 
added.) 
Although plaintiffs attorneys attempted to get Mr. Johnson to alter his testimony at trial, 
he did not. (R. 593.) Therefore, plaintiffs negligence was at least equal to any 
negligence she wants to bestow upon the defendant for the defendant's use of that road. 
Her knowledge of the road would have required her to use a different route, according to 
plaintiffs own argument, or to use extraordinary care. She did neither and therefore any 
error in the Court's refusal to give the requested jury instruction was harmless. 
Finally, parties are not entitled to have every creative theory they may come 
up with reduced to a jury instruction. Plaintiffs theory against defendant was negligence. 
The umbrella of negligence certainly includes plaintiffs theory that the defendant should 
have used a different route. The Court did not preclude the defendant from arguing her 
8 
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theory in closing, and indeed, the plaintiff made a detailed argument regarding this unsafe 
route theory, but the jury was simply unconvinced. 
B. The Court Did Not Refuse to Give a "Sudden Peril" Instruction. Plaintiff 
Failed to Preserve This Issue on Appeal. 
Plaintiffs counsel proposed the following jury instruction: 
You may appropriately determine that Mr. Hyatt's negligence 
was a proximate cause of Ms. Holmstrom's injuries if, but not 
only if, you find: (1) that Mr. Hyatt negligently caused the 
situation of sudden peril; and (2) that Ms. Holmstrom, acting 
under the impulse of fear, made an instinctive effort to 
escape; and (3) in doing so, Ms. Holmstrom sustained 
injuries, even though it may now appear that 
Ms. Holmstrom's attempt to escape was unwise or should 
have been made differently. 
The defendant objected to the jury instruction as written because it was a 
variation of the "MUJI" stock instruction. The phrase "if, but not only i f appeared 
confusing and the defendant asked that it either be removed or modified such that the jury 
would understand it. The Court, after reading the proposed instruction, agreed, stating: 
Is there another way to phrase that so that, I'm not sure that I 
understand it when I read it, what the 'but not only if does to 
the phrase. 
(R. 820.) 
In addition, defendant asked the Court to add a balancing sentence which 
stated that if the imminent peril was caused by the plaintiffs own conduct, that you are to 
9 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
disregard the instruction. (R. 821.) After the defendant requested the balancing sentence, 
the following conversation took place: 
(R. 822.) 
THE COURT: 
MR. COLLINS: 
THE COURT: 
I think that's accurate. Is there a way to 
do the introductory that kind of makes 
clear for the jury that is not, your case 
doesn't live or fall on this one 
instruction? 
You know, and we've got to keep this 
thing moving. What this is going to 
require is a couple of minutes of me 
seeing what I can come up with and 
seeing if Mr. Naegle and I can work it 
out. Could I have a couple of minutes to 
see what I can create and see if 
Mr. Naegle will agree to it? 
Fll let you do that. What I'll do is I'll 
get the clerk started on the two that you 
have and the other one here. 
The Court was clearly willing to give an "imminent peril" jury instruction. 
In fact, it would have given the stock MUJI instruction. The Court went even further and 
was willing to give another variation of this instruction, devised by plaintiffs counsel, so 
long as it was not confusing. The Court simply asked plaintiffs counsel to rephrase the 
"if, but not only i f part of the instruction. Plaintiffs counsel said that he would do so 
and work it out with defense counsel. Plaintiff suggests in her brief that "Ms. Holmstrom 
10 
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and the defendants were unable to agree to satisfactory alternative language and, 
accordingly, the district court did not give the proposed instruction." (Appellant's Brief, 
p. 20.) In fact, plaintiffs counsel never came to defense counsel with alternative 
language, and never went to the Court with alternative language. The record clearly 
reflects that no further conversation was had with respect to this jury instruction. 
Plaintiff simply failed to give the Court the opportunity to rule on the issue after plaintiff 
said it would revise the proposed instruction and present it to the Court. Indeed, the 
record is devoid of any language by the Court denying plaintiffs request for a "sudden 
peril" jury instruction. 
Having failed to preserve this issue on appeal, plaintiff cannot now suggest 
that there was "off the record" discussions between plaintiff and defendant regarding this 
instruction and because no agreement was reached, the plaintiff "assumed" the Court 
would deny his request. No "off-the-record discussions" were held between plaintiff and 
defense counsel, and plaintiff never allowed the Court to specifically rule on the 
instruction. After the jury was instructed, the Court stated: 
THE COURT: The record will reflect that the jury is out 
of the courtroom, the door is closed. 
Counsel, any problems with the 
instructions as read other than the 
objections that were made for the record 
prior to preparation? 
11 
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MR. COLLINS: None from us, Your Honor. 
MR. NAEGLE: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. Anything we need to make part of 
the record? 
MR. COLLINS: Not us. 
(R. 858.) 
Accordingly, because the Court was never given the opportunity to rule on 
plaintiffs request for a "sudden peril" jury instruction, this issue is not properly before 
this Court. 
C. The Court Properly Denied Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
Notwithstanding the Verdict with Respect to the Proximate Cause Issue. 
To prevail on this proximate cause issue, plaintiff must convince this Court 
that based on the evidence presented, any reasonable juror would be forced to conclude 
that (1) there was a cause-and-effect relationship between the defendants' negligence and 
the plaintiffs injuries; (2) that the defendants' negligence played a "substantial role" in 
causing those injuries; and (3) that a reasonable person could foresee that some injury 
could result from that negligence. 
In essence, the plaintiff is making the argument that there was insufficient 
evidence for the jury to conclude as they did on the issue of proximate cause. Therefore, 
12 
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this issue is "at the extreme end of the discretion spectrum" and this Court should give 
great deference to the trier-of-fact. Crookston v. Fire Ins, Exck, 860 P.2d 937, 938 (Utah 
1993). 
Plaintiffs argument, taken to its logical extreme, purports to do away with 
the concept of "proximate cause." Plaintiff suggests that any time a jury finds a 
defendant negligent, that jury must also find that there was a cause and effect relationship 
and that the defendant's negligence must have played a "substantial role in causing the 
injuries." The concept of proximate cause argues against that theory. The law accepts 
the fact that an individual may be negligent, but not the proximate cause of another's 
injuries. This Court has stated that: 
Trial court [is] justified in granting a JNOV only if, after 
looking at all the evidence and all its reasonable inferences in 
light most favorable to [the non-moving party], the trial court 
concludes that there [is] no competent evidence to support a 
verdict in [the non-moving party's] favor. (Emphasis added.) 
Ricci v. Shultz, 963 P.2d 784, 785 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
In arguing that there was no competent evidence to support the verdict, the 
plaintiff ignores the testimony of her own expert accident reconstructionist, Ronald L. 
Probert. Mr. Probert testified that even if Mr. Hyatt, the defendant, had made his turn 
entirely within his own lane, there was a "very good likelihood" that the accident still 
13 
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would have occurred based on the fact that the responding police officer's measurements, 
which Mr. Probert did not dispute, placed the plaintiffs vehicle entirely left of center 
except for her right-side passenger tires. (Tr., Vol. II, pp. 249-250.) 
This evidence alone is competent evidence supporting the jury's verdict that 
either there was no "cause and effect" relationship between Mr. Hyatt's negligence and 
Ms. Holmstrom's injuries or that Mr. Hyatt's negligence did not play a "substantial role" 
in causing those injuries. 
Further supporting evidence that the defendant did not play a substantial 
role in causing the accident is that plaintiffs expert witness, Ron Probert, testified that it 
is plausible that the defendant was stopped in the roadway, as he testified, for at least two 
seconds prior to impact. (Tr. 259.) Further, Mr. Probert testified that if the defendant 
was stopped in the roadway for two second, a plausible scenario, then the plaintiff could 
have avoided the accident by simply staying in her own lane and safely passing by the 
stopped truck. (Tr. 260-261.) Finally, Officer Reid Garff, the investigating police 
officer, testified that as the plaintiff came out of the "S" curve, she was considerably left 
of center and that the plaintiff told him that she was looking down at her clock and that 
when she looked up, "there the truck was." (Tr. 778.) His opinion of the plaintiffs 
14 
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conduct was that "she was not paying attention to where she was going. She was 
watching her clock." (Tr. 779.) 
Taken together, the jury had evidence before it, presented by the plaintiff 
herself, the responding police officer and the plaintiffs own expert accident 
reconstructionist, which could lead a reasonable juror to conclude that the plaintiff was 
not paying attention to where she was going; that she was almost entirely left of center at 
the point of impact; that the defendant saw the plaintiff and stopped his truck for a full 
two seconds prior to impact, without any corresponding reaction on the plaintiffs part; 
and that even if the defendant had stayed entirely in his own lane, the accident still would 
have occurred because the plaintiff was so far left of center. This is certainly reasonable 
evidence, if not overwhelming, in favor of the jury's verdict. The jury apparently 
concluded that although the defendant may have been negligent for crossing the center 
line slightly, his negligence did not play a substantial role in causing the accident and 
resulting injury. The jury concluded that the defendant was paying attention, stopped his 
vehicle when he saw the plaintiff, but that the plaintiff was not paying attention and 
struck the defendant's vehicle while her vehicle was almost entirely left of center. 
Accordingly, the jury properly interpreted the proximate cause jury instruction and 
determined that there was either no cause and effect relationship, or that the defendant's 
15 
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negligence did not play a substantial role in causing the plaintiffs injuries. Either way, 
they were justified by the facts and by the law in reaching their conclusion. 
D. The Court Properly Denied Plaintiffs Motion for a New Trial on All Issues. 
Plaintiffs final issue on appeal is simply that the entire jury's verdict was 
based on insufficient evidence. This Court's standard of review for this issue is "at the 
extreme end of the discretion spectrum . . . " and great deference should be given the 
jury's verdict. See Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 860 P.2d 937, 938 (Utah 1993). The 
Utah Supreme Court has stated that: 
A trial court should carefully consider whether it is 
appropriate to grant a new trial on the basis of insufficiency 
of evidence. In Goddard, 658 P.2d at 532, this court noted, 
"the power of a trial judge to order a new trial is to be used in 
those rare cases where a jury verdict is manifestly against the 
weight of the evidence." See also Nelson v. Trujillo, 657 
P.2d 730, 732 (Utah 1992). ("A second trial is not without its 
costs in terms of scarce litigant and judicial resources . . . . 
Consequently, the trial judge's prerogative to grant a new trial 
on an evidentiary basis under Rule 59(a)(6) should be 
exercised with forebearance.") 
Braithwaite v. West Valley City Corp., 921 P.2d 997 (Utah 1996). 
16 
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In addition, the Supreme Court stated in Winters v. W.S. Hatch Co., 546 
P.2d 603 (Utah 1976), that: 
The sole issue before the court on this appeal is whether the 
record discloses any substantial evidence to support the 
verdict of the jury. A motion for judgment notwithstanding 
the verdict presents solely a question of law to be determined 
by the court. In passing on a motion of this kind, the court is 
not justified in trespassing in the province of the jury in its 
prerogative to judge all questions of fact in the case. The 
court is not free to weigh the evidence, and the weight of the 
evidence and the credibility of the witnesses are within the 
jury's sole province. In considering a motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict, the trial court must view the 
evidence most favorable to the party against whom the motion 
is made. 
Mat 605. 
For the same reasons stated in subsection "C" of this brief, plaintiffs 
argument that there is insufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict must fail. This 
Court must review the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant and grant a 
new trial only in that rare case where the "jury verdict is manifestly against the weight of 
the evidence." Considering the fact that plaintiffs have presented the Court with five 
pages of evidence supporting the jury verdict, including substantial evidence from both 
fact and expert witnesses, plaintiffs argument that the evidence is "so slight and 
unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly unreasonable and unjust" seems hollow. A 
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quick review of pages 29 through 34 of plaintiff s brief establishes more than enough 
evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant, to support the jury's 
verdict. 
Plaintiffs admit that there are no Utah cases with similar facts that support* 
their position. They argue, however, three cases from other jurisdictions support their 
position. However, the Court will note that the plaintiff did not lay out the factual 
scenario in any of the three cases cited because to do so would expose the weaknesses of 
the comparison. 
In Hardison v. Bushnell, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d, 106 (Cal. App. 1993), the 
plaintiff was a passenger in a vehicle traveling northbound on Old River Road. The 
defendant was traveling south on Old River Road. The defendant then turned left across 
the northbound lanes and was struck by the northbound vehicle. The collision occurred 
in the northbound lane. The jury found the defendant negligent but not a proximate 
cause, potentially because the driver of the plaintiffs vehicle was speeding and had 
consumed alcohol before the accident. The California Court of Appeals reversed the 
judgment, concluding that the verdict was not supported by substantial evidence. 
The California case and the case before this Court are easily distinguished. 
The plaintiff in Hardison never left his lane of travel. The accident occurred fully within 
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the plaintiffs lane of travel. The defendant turned left in front of the plaintiff, 
obstructing his entire lane. None of those factors are present in the case before this 
Court. In this case, the accident occurred almost entirely in the defendant's lane of travel 
because the plaintiff was left of center. In the case before this Court, the substantial 
evidence suggests that the plaintiff was not paying attention, did not correct her vehicle 
back into her own lane as she came out of an "S" curve, and struck a stopped vehicle in 
the opposite lane of travel. Had those facts been before the California court, it is highly 
unlikely they would have found that the jury's verdict was not supported by substantial 
evidence. 
In the Rogers v. Di Christina, 600 N. Y.S. 2d 402 (N. Y. App. 1993), the 
plaintiff was involved in two separate rear end accidents and consolidated the two 
accidents into one case. At trial, the defense argued that the plaintiffs injury, a herniated 
disk, was caused by a work related accident rather that the two automobile accidents. 
The jury found the defendants' negligent but not the proximate cause of plaintiff s injury. 
The trial court granted plaintiffs motion to set aside the jury verdict as against the weight 
of evidence. The appellate court sustained the lower court. However, the appellate 
court's decision, only three paragraphs long, does not include any discussion of the 
evidence presented at trial other than to say that "several medical witnesses testified 
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regarding the nature and cause of plaintiff s injuries." Id As a result, this case supplies 
no support for the plaintiffs proposition. It simply stands for the proposition that a jury's 
verdict might be overturned because of insufficient evidence, but it provides no factual 
basis for its determination and therefore supplies no support for the plaintiffs contentions 
in this case. 
Finally, inMurteza v. State of Connecticut, 508 A.2d 449 (Conn. App. 
1986), the plaintiff was injured when the vehicle in which she was a passenger struck 
another vehicle which had run a red light. The court found the defendant negligent but 
not the proximate cause of the plaintiffs injuries. The plaintiff appealed and the court 
upheld the jury's verdict. In doing so, the court stated that "the trial court's refusal to set 
aside the verdict is entitled to great weight and every reasonable presumption should be 
given in favor of its correctness." Id at 453. The court ultimately ruled that: 
The jury, as the ultimate judge of the credibility of witnesses 
and the weight to be accorded their testimony, was entitled to 
disbelieve the plaintiffs damage claims entirely. 
Id at 449. 
Plaintiff either misreads the Murteza case or the proximate cause jury 
instruction given to the jury in the case before this Court. It is not enough that the jury 
simply find a "cause and effect relationship." The jury was instructed that "cause and 
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effect alone is not enough." In addition, the jury must find the negligence to have played 
a "substantial role in causing the injury." The question of whether a "substantial injury" 
occurred is irrelevant to this discussion. "Cause and effect" does not determine 
proximate cause, as suggested by plaintiff. It is only one factor, but it, alone, is not 
enough. The jury had sufficient evidence before it to conclude either there was no "cause 
and effect" relationship or that even if there was a "cause and effect" relationship, the 
negligence of defendant did not play a "substantial role" in causing the plaintiffs injuries, 
whether the injuries were substantial or not. Regardless of which they chose, it defeated 
the proximate cause element of the claimed tort. 
Finally, plaintiff states as support for her argument, that her counsel has 
"found no case from Utah or elsewhere with facts and issues similar to ones involved in 
this case, in which a no proximate cause verdict has been upheld on appeal." 
(Appellant's Brief, p. 48.) That evidence supports defendant's position, not plaintiffs. 
Because the Court must look at all the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
defendant and must grant the jury's verdict and trial court's rulings great deference, the 
lack of case law supporting plaintiffs position preponderates heavily in favor of the 
defendant. 
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V- CONCLUSION AND STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT, 
Plaintiff has failed to establish a duty for the motoring public to 
affirmatively choose the safest route between destinations versus the shortest route. If a 
road is unsafe, or hazardous, the cause of action is against those who made it unsafe, not 
against the member of the public who is rightfully using a public road. 
Plaintiff failed to preserve the "sudden peril" jury instruction issue on 
appeal. 
Plaintiffs remaining two issues are based on a claimed "insufficiency of 
evidence" argument and this Court must view all evidence in a light most favorable to the 
defendant and should not weigh the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses, as those 
are within the jury's sole province. There is more than substantial evidence to support 
the jury's verdict. If no other evidence was presented by the defendant at trial, other than 
the cross-examination testimony it elicited from plaintiffs own expert accident 
reconstructionist, the jury's verdict must stand. Accordingly, the defendant respectfully 
requests that the Court uphold the jury's verdict and the trial court's ruling denying 
plaintiffs request for a new trial. 
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